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The Labor Market Value to Legal Status
* 
 
We present estimates of the effect of legal immigration status on earnings of undocumented 
workers. Our contribution to the literature centers on a two-step procedure that allows us to 
first estimate the legal status of an immigrant and then estimate the effect of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA) on immigrants’ labor market outcomes using a triple 
difference approach. From a sample of young to middle aged Mexican men, our results show 
that IRCA causes a 20 log point increase in labor market earnings of Mexican immigrants 
over the long run, and that nearly all of this increase is in the occupational wage. These 
results suggest that the primary disadvantage for undocumented workers is the type of jobs 
that they are able to obtain. We estimate the model for immigrants from other countries not 
benefiting from IRCA to the extent that Mexican immigrants did, and find no systematic bias 
towards positive and significant results. 
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documented immigrants at around 11 million. A majority of these people are
Mexican born (54%), and a majority of recent Mexican immigrants (80%)
are undocumented (Passel 2005). Public opposition to immigration, partic-
ularly unauthorized immigration, has increased as unemployment rates have
risen. However, there still remains some public support for a path to legal
status, even in immigrant heavy states. A recent LA Times poll found that
68% of Californians supported allowing immigrants who have been working
in the U.S illegally and who entered illegally, but have been employed for
the last two years, to be allowed to stay in the U.S. Even when focusing on
White Anglo Californians, the poll found that a majority (56%) still supports
this policy (Decker 2010). Recent proposals for immigration reform have in-
cluded some path to regularized status for the undocumented. Research that
pins down the magnitude of the eect of legal status on earnings and sheds
some light on the mechanisms through which this takes place could be very
valuable to the current policy debate.
In this paper, we estimate the change in earnings for Mexican born work-
ers of the last general amnesty for undocumented workers: the Immigration
Control and Reform Act (IRCA) of 1986. Eligibility for IRCA required that
immigrants had resided in the U.S. since prior to 1982. If legal status was ob-
served in the Census, a simple dierence-in-dierence approach between the
documented and undocumented who arrived before and after that date would
be sucient to identify the causal eect of obtaining legal status through the
2amnesty on labor market outcomes. As legal status is not observed in the
Census, we turn to a survey in which it is observed: the Mexican Migration
Project. Using this dataset, we estimate a logistic regression of documenta-
tion status on a number of demographic variables that are also observed in
the Census. We use the parameters estimated in this model to predict the
likelihood that an individual observed in the U.S. Census is undocumented.
Following this, a dierence-in-dierence model is estimated to identify the
causal eect of legal status obtained under IRCA on labor market outcomes
of Mexican migrants. By focusing on both overall earnings and occupational
wages, our ndings also attempt to shed some light on how labor markets
function for these workers.
Our study also includes a number of placebo tests. Using our sample of
Mexican migrants, we run our model on a number of outcome variables for
which we do not expect to nd signicant eects. We estimate the eect on
overall earnings and occupational wages for groups for whom we would not
expect to nd an eect. Specically, we measure the eect of IRCA eligibility
on the labor market outcomes of U.S. born Latinos and non-Mexican immi-
grants (a group that, on average, is much less likely to be undocumented).
Finally, we estimate our model separately for the immigrants from 55 coun-
tries that are the largest senders of migrants to the U.S. and examine the
empirical distribution of T-statistics from these regressions to look for any
systematic bias towards nding statisitcally signicant positive eects.
31 Prior Evidence on Eect of Legal Status
There has been a number of previous studies which attempt to estimate the
eect of legal status on labor market outcomes. Additionally, there are a
number of relevant studies which suggest mechanisms through which this
eect may take place. In other words, if legal status has eects on labor
market outcomes, there should be both theoretical and empirical evidence
for the mechanisms through which this takes place.
1.1 Evidence on Potential Mechanisms of Eect
Recently, economists have begun to study whether the low pay of undocu-
mented workers is attributable to exploitation by employers. The underlying
assumption is that legal status would improve bargaining power. Hotchkiss
and Quispe-Agnoli (2009) test for this. Using the invalid Social Security num-
bers as a proxy for being undocumented, they nd that documented workers
are less attached to a particular rm than are undocumented workers. This
dierence in labor elasticity of supply to the rm results in equally produc-
tive documented and undocumented workers being paid dierent wages. This
dierence is likely a result of a lower arrival rate of job oers for undocu-
mented workers, as some rms may not be willing to hire them. 1 Chen
(2010) nds that Mexican born workers have much higher returns to being
1Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli (2009) apply the model used by Ransom and Oaxaca
(2010) and Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) to measure the contribution of dierential market
power over male and female workers to the male-female earnings gap.
4in a union than natives and other immigrant groups. Both of these studies
are consistent with employer market power over undocumented immigrants
explaining their lower wages relative to natives.
Undocumented workers may also not be able to compete for the same set
of jobs as the documented. Peri and Sparber (2009) show that low-skilled
natives specialize in occupations requiring communication (as they are likely
to have a better command of English), while the comparative advantage of
low-skilled immigrants is to work in occupations that require more manual
labor. A similar point is made by Ball, Dube and Sorensen (2010), who show
that occupations heavy in communicative tasks are more likely to require
an occupational license than are occupations that are more manual task
intensive. Their paper also documents the fact that Mexican born workers,
more likely to be undocumented, are less likely to be employed in licensed
occupations.
Probably the most important single determinate of wages is human cap-
ital. Cortes (2004) nds that foreign born populations from refugee send-
ing countries tend to invest less in human capital during their time in the
United States than do immigrants from other countries. This is likely caused
by refuggees' discounting the returns on these investments on account of a
higher likelihood of return to their home country. The same may be said
for undocumented immigrants, who, fearing deportation, do not nd it prof-
itable to undertake costly investments in formal education, language skills,
or other forms of human capital that may pay a very low return should they
5have to return to their home country. This is also documented by Lozano
(2010), Dustmann (1993) and Dustmann (2003).
1.2 Estimates on Magnitude of Eect
Below we give an overview of previous works that study the magnitude of
changes in legal status on labor market outcomes. These include papers using
variation from IRCA, focusing both on the eects on those directly treated by
the program as well as second order eects, and papers using other sources
of variation in legal status. We summarize the principle ndings of these
papers in Figure 1.
Papers studying the eect of IRCA on the labor market outcomes of
those who beneted from the program include Cobb-Clark and Kossoudji
(1995), Rivera-Batiz (1999), Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002), Amuedo-
Dorantes, Bansak and Raphael (2007), Hill, Lofstrom and Hayes (2010),
Pastor, Scoggins, Tran and Ortiz (2010), Barcellos (2010) and Pan (2010).
These studies all nd positive eects of IRCA on earnings. Hill et al. (2010),
using the Legalized Population Survey, nds the smallest of the eects and
very little evidence of occupational mobility, at least in the short run.
Papers examining the indirect eects of IRCA include Phillips and Massey
(1999), Orrenius and Zavodny (2004), and Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli
(2008), all of which estimate the eect of IRCA on workers who may be
substitutes in the labor market for those treated under IRCA, and nd small
or no eects. A paper by Bean, Leach, Brown, Bachmeier and Hipp (2011)
6measures the eect of parents' legal status on educational outcomes of second
generation children by exploiting the sharp design of IRCA.
Other studies on the eects of legal status include Bratsberg, Jr. and
Nasir (2002), studying individuals naturalized for a number of dierent rea-
sons, Kaushal (2006), studying the eect of the Hurricane Mitch response of
the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA),
Gass-Kandilov (2007), studying the eect of the movement from H1B visas
to green cards for high-skilled workers, Chi and Drewianka (2010), studying
the eect of changes in legal status through marriage, and Orrenius, Zavodny
and Kerr (2011), studying amnesty granted to Chinese students in the wake
of Tiananmen Square.
The key dierence between our work and the above studies is the choice
of a counterfactual group and the source of variation used to identify the
causal eect of legal status on the labor market outcomes of undocumented
workers. Nearly all previous work compares changes in outcomes of those
receiving legal status to changes in outcomes for those already having legal
status. A more natural counterfactual group would be those who never have
legal status.
Another contribution of our paper is to exploit the 1982 cuto in IRCA
eligibility. To the best of our knowledge, only Bean et al. (2011), Pan (2010)
and Barcellos (2010) do this. Bean et al. (2011)'s research question relates
to the outcomes of the second generation and thus is not comparable. Both
Barcellos (2010) and Pan (2010) make important contributions to the liter-
7ature with their approach. Barcellos (2010)'s use of an RDD design is novel
and is likely the cleanest use of the cuto date. However, both of these pa-
pers do not make an explicit distinction between the documented and the
undocumented. Thus, a share of their treatment group did not benet from
the treatment, as they were already documented. We believe this is the most
likely cause of the smaller estimates that are obtained in both of these pa-
pers. Indeed, when we estimate a similar model here, we also nd smaller
numbers. In summary, we believe that our use of the 1982 cuto data for
IRCA eligibility, combined with our variable measuring the likelihood of be-
ing undocumented, provide the most credible estimates to date of the eect
of legal status obtained through IRCA on labor market outcomes.
82 Identication Strategy and Data
In attempting to identify the impact of legal status on earnings, we face two
major challenges in the data. First, there is no large data set that reports
labor market outcomes and documentation status for both documented and
undocumented immigrants. The Legalized Population Survey (LPS) provides
data only for those who received legal status under IRCA, but not for those
who did not.
The U.S. Census provides a large sample size, detailed, high quality data
on labor market outcomes, and information on year of arrival in the United
States. Changes in the population between 1990 and 2000 that cannot be
explained by natural population growth or authorized immigration suggest
that the Census captures a large share of the undocumented.
Were documentation status known in the Census, one could estimate a
simple dierence approach comparing the wages of the undocumented eligi-
ble for the program to wages of the undocumented ineligible for the program
(where eligibility is determined by migration to the United States prior to
1982). To control for changes in the macro economy as a whole during this
time period, one could estimate a dierence-in-dierence model that com-
pared this change to a similar change for the documented. Finally, if one
were worried that the characteristics of the undocumented changed (relative
to the documented) during this period, one could estimate a dierence-in-
dierence-in-dierence model that controlled for changes in wages of the un-
9documented relative to the documented around some future cuto year, for
example 1992.
However, there is no question in the Census that asks about documenta-
tion status. This data is available in the Mexican Migration Project (MMP).
Summary statistics for our samples from both of these datasets are reported
in Table 1.
102.1 Estimating the Eect of IRCA with
Mexican Migration Project Data
The Mexican Migration Project (MMP) is signicantly smaller than the U.S.
Census data, with the count of Mexican migrants diering by orders of mag-
nitude in the two surveys. The MMP is a random sample of households in
migrant-sending communities in Mexico. As the survey is at the household
level, information is available on immigrants currently residing in the United
States as long as some of their family members remain in Mexico. This is
a situation that is quite common in Mexican migration, which typically in-
volves sending a prime-aged male to the United States to work and send
remittances back home.
The MMP is a retrospective survey, and thus recall error brings into ques-
tion the quality of the labor market data. The MMP also collects detailed
information on legal status and demographics, both of which are likely less
subject to recall error than specic quantitative measures of labor market
outcomes. The availability of these variables allows us to conduct a prelimi-
nary and very straight-forward approach to measure the eect of legal status:
seeing how wages change as an individual's legal status changes.
ln(wi) = doci + expi + iMMP (1)
This xed eects estimation serves to eliminate any time invariant un-
observed heterogeneity that may aect both legal status and labor market
11outcomes. We also control for the number of years that have passed between
the two observations to take account of changes in experience. Of course, the
questionable quality of the wage data does imply that these results should
be taken with a grain of salt.
122.2 Forecasting Legal Status with MMP Data
As discussed above, we generally regard the U.S. Census data as more appro-
priate for our study; its only major shortcoming is the lack of information on
documentation status. We thus turn to an estimation approach that com-
bines information from both of the surveys. Our primary use of the MMP
data is to estimate the relationship between legal status and variables that
are observed in both the MMP and the Census. This allows us to create an
out of sample "forecast" of the likelihood that an individual in the Census
arrived in the U.S. as an undocumented immigrant. This is similar to the
methodology used by Arellano and Meghir (1992) who measure job search
and labor supply using information from two dierent U.K. surveys.
We incorporate the information provided by the MMP by rst running
a logistic regression on an indicator that a migrant reported being undoc-
umented in their rst migration. We select a sample of individuals in the
MMP who reported their rst migration to the United States taking place
between 1980 and 1984, inclusively. These sample dates reect the policy
enacted by IRCA, which we discuss at more length below. We further limit
our sample to males in non-agricultural occupations who were between age
16 and 44 at the time of their rst migration to the U.S. Individuals below
age 16 are likely tied migrants moving to the U.S with their families and not
economic migrants. As individuals over age 45 are a very small share of these
migrants, we drop them from the sample to avoid our logistic results being
driven by a small number of outliers. We also drop observations with missing
13values for the education and marriage variables. Individuals are considered
"undocumented" if they report that as their documentation status on their
rst migration to the U.S.
The left hand side variable in our model is an indicator for an immigrant
self-reporting being undocumented during their rst migration. On the right
hand side, we include age at rst migration, its square, years of education, its
square, indicators for marital status (divorced or widowed being the omitted
categories), and all pairwise interactions of the variables. The education and
marital status variables are measured at the time of the survey in both the
Census and the MMP. There is simply no way for us to know the values
of these variables at the time of migration to the U.S. and we believe that
even ex-post values of these variables can tell us something about the type
of migrant that we are dealing with, i.e. were they more or less likely to
have initially migrated to the U.S. without documents 2. Where or not these
variables do indeed have predictive power is an empirical question that is
addressed by the rst stage results from our estimation. The latent variable
in the logistic regression can then be represented as follows:
doci = xiMMP + uiMMP (2)
After obtaining the Maximum Likelihood values of , we can then forecast
out of sample the likelihood that an individual i is undocumented, provided
2In the MMP there is a variable that measures marital status at the time of rst
migration to the U.S.; however, a vast majority of our observations have a missing value
for this variable.
14that we have information on demographic characteristics x of this individual.
The above described x characteristics are collected for both the MMP and
Census. Turning to the Census data, we assign the following likelihood that
an observed individual is undocumented. We forecast this likelihood based
on the estimates above for undocumented migrants from the early 1980s, as
even in the 2000 census we are trying to net out unobserved changes in these
types of workers in order to control for things that may have been happening
to them before and after 1982 relative to documented workers.
^ doci =
exp(^ xiCensus)
1 + exp(^ xiCensus)
(3)
152.3 Estimation with Census Data and
Forecasted Documentation Status
Using this predicted documentation variable, one might be tempted to run
an OLS regression of earnings on this variable to infer the labor market
returns to legal status. However, this ignores another data issue in the Cen-
sus: missing information on characteristics such as motivation, attachment
to networks, and ability. These unobserved characteristics are likely to be
correlated both with documentation status and (directly) with labor mar-
ket outcomes. This calls for an approach that can control for unobserved
individual heterogeneity.
It also seems appropriate in an OLS regression to control for observable
characteristics that should aect labor market outcomes, such as years of
education and age at arrival in the United States. If all of these variables are
used in the rst stage as well, separately identifying the direct eect of these
variables and the eect of these variables through ^ doc would rely solely on
non-linearity. Economic identication would require an exclusion restriction:
a demographic variable that aects ^ doc but has no direct impact on labor
market outcomes.
Luckily, IRCA provides just such variation. IRCA allowed individuals
present in the U.S. since before January 1, 1982, to apply for permanent
residency. In the 1990 Census, we only know year intervals of arrival to the
United States. Luckily, one interval is the years 1980 and 1981, and another
16is 1982, 1983, and 1984. As there was no way to anticipate the enactment
and timing of this policy in 1981/1982, one would expect that immigrants
just before the end of 1981 and just after the beginning of 1982 to be very
similar. We provide some evidence of this both in our summary statistics
and in a set of gures in the next section.
The sharp design of IRCA and some measure of documentation status
provide us with three possible dierence-in-dierence approaches.
2.3.1 DD1: Time Based Di-in-Di
One possible identication strategy is to compare the dierence in outcomes
for individuals in our sample who entered in 1980-1981 to the outcomes
of individuals who entered in 1982-1984. Of course, this simple dierence
approach would confound dierences in eligibility with dierences in years of
labor market experience in the U.S. This motivates a dierence-in-dierence
approach where the above dierence is compared to a similar dierence,
calculated using 2000 census data, for individuals who arrived in 1990-1991
versus those who arrived in 1992-1994. This approach would lump together
the undocumented, who beneted from IRCA, and the documented, who
did not directly benet from IRCA. Thus one would expect that it may
underestimate the true eect of the program. The estimating equation for





1 1(ti = 90)+
DD1
2 1(ai < 2)+
DD1
3 1(ai < 2;ti = 90)+
1
it (4)
where yit is a labor market outcome, 1(t = 90) is a binary variable indi-
cating that the observation is from the 1990 census, 1(a < 2) is an indicator
of year of migration being 1980, 1981, 1990, or 1991, and the  terms are
parameters. The eect of IRCA is then identied o the interaction of the
observation being from the 1990 census and for an individual who migrated
"before the 2 year" (1980 or 1981).
2.3.2 DD2: Documentation Status Based Di-in-Di
A second possible identication strategy is to compare the dierence in out-
comes for individuals who are likely documented to those who are not, using
only data from the 1990 census. This strategy more precisely models the
eect of the program, but may be problematic if characteristics of the undoc-
umented changed dierently than characteristics of the documented between






1 ^ doci + 
DD2
2 1(ai < 2) + 
DD2
3 1(ai < 2) ^ doci + 
2
it (5)
where ^ doci is the tted probability that individual i was undocumented
18on their arrival in the U.S. The eect of IRCA is then identied o the
interaction of the tted probability of the likelihood of being undocumented
and the indicator that individual i migrated "before the 2 year" (1980 or
1981).
2.3.3 DDD: Tripple Dierence Estimation
To address the concerns about each of the potential dierence-in-dierence






1 ^ doci + 
DDD
2 1(ai < 2) + 
DDD
3 1(ti = 90) (6)
+ 
DDD
4 1(ai < 2) ^ doci + 
DDD
5 1(ti = 90) ^ doci + 
DDD
6 1(ti = 90)1(a < 2)
+ 
DDD
6 1(ti = 90)1(a < 2) ^ doci + 
2
it
The identication of the eect of IRCA now comes o of the triple in-
teraction between an observation being from the 1990 census, the likelihood
of being undocumented, and the observation corresponding to an individual
who migrated "before the 2 year" (1980 or 1981). Our key identifying as-
sumption is that the characteristics, both observed and unobserved, of the
undocumented did not change before or after the "2 year" at a dierent rate
than they changed for the documented, in 1990 as compared to 2000. This
identifying assumption is essentially untestable, as the only measure that we
19have of the likelihood of an individual being undocumented must include
certain demographic characteristics that we must assume are not changing
in the dimension above. However, we do provide some supporting evidence
that our observations are essentially "comparable", the way that we need
them to be in order to obtain a consistent estimate of the treatment eect.
2.3.4 Placebo Estimates
To further explore the validity of our design, we run a number of placebo
estimates. Our rst set of estimates will look for evidence that IRCA changed
labor market earnings for Mexican migrants, as described above, in such a
way as to bias us towards nding non-results when we estimate the eect
of IRCA on labor market outcomes. To address this concern, we choose a
number of outcome variables that we do not believe will be aected by IRCA
and test for the presence of any estimated eect. We report the results of
these estimations in our next section.
Another possible cause of false positive results would be a host country
specic (positive) change that aects all immigrants, not only the undocu-
mented. This would bias us towards nding positive results. Put another
way, the triple dierence that is designed to estimate the eect of IRCA
should only aect immigrants from countries that are directly aected by
IRCA.
To search for bias towards nding results for IRCA, we run our model on
a total of 48 countries, and examine two things. First, we plot the empir-
20ical distribution of T-statistics obtained from the triple interaction term in
the main regression. A skewed empirical distribution suggests a lower power
of our estimate for Mexican migrants than a standard T-distribution would
predict. Second, we present a scatter plot of the estimated T-statistics for
each country in our placebo sample plotted against an estimate of the impor-
tance of IRCA to that community. Overall, we should expect more evidence
of a signicant eect of IRCA for individuals from countries that beneted
greatly from IRCA, i.e. countries that had a large population of undocu-
mented immigrants living in the United States in the early 1990s.
2.3.5 Obtaining Consistent Estimates of Standard Errors
Because our main regression model contains a variable constructed based
on our rst stage estimated parameters, the typical calculation of standard
errors will not consistently estimate their true value. To address this problem,
all such estimates are bootstrapped with 5000 replications. Our variance
covariance matrix also accounts for robust standard errors and clusters at
the state level.
213 Results
3.1 Results from MMP Data
Table 3 presents estimates of a xed eects regression from the Mexican
Migration Project data. In this estimation, we use all observations also
included in our logistic regression on legal status that have complete labor
market information for both their rst and last migration to the U.S. (the
only two migrations on which MMP collects information on labor market
outcomes). Here, we use wages rather than annual earnings, as that is all
that is available in the survey.
Our results are positive and signicant at the 1% level. They indicate that
there is approximately a 21 log point eect of legal status on earnings. This
is after controlling for time invariant individual heterogeneity and changes in
experience between the two observations.
Results from our rst stage logit are presented in 2. The model has
signicant explanatory power, as we can reject a Wald-test of the joint in-
signicance of the parameters with greater than 99.9% condence. However,
the overall explanatory power of the model is relatively low, with a pseudo
R-squared of around .10.
223.2 Results from Combined Census and MMP Data
The results of our main estimation are shown graphically in Figure 2 and
Figure 3. Full results are presented in Table 4.
The rst gure shows eight plots related to annual earnings. The left
panel represents data from the 1990 census, while the right panel represents
data from the 2000 census.
The non-linear series represent density plots of the estimated probability
of being undocumented for both the group of migrants that moved to the
U.S. in 1980-1981 (1990-1991), as well as the group that moved from 1982
through 1984 (1992 through 1994). The strong overlap between these two
plots suggests that the observable characteristics of these two groups are
indeed very similar: if they were in aggregate dierent from one another, we
would expect to nd dierent predictions of the likelihood that members of
the two groups were undocumented according to the estimates obtained from
our logit on MMP data.
We now turn our attention to the estimated treatment eect of IRCA
represented by the two gures. It is important not to confuse our approach
with a propensity score matching approach: we are not comparing dierences
between treatment and control group observations with a similar likelihood
of treatment. In our case, two conditions must be met in order to receive
treatment. First, an observation must come from the pre 1982 group. Second,
the observation must represent an individual who is undocumented. Thus,
we will not take the average in the dierences in the outcome variable at
23each point in this plot. Rather, we compare changes in earnings for the two
groups as we increase the likelihood that an individual is undocumented.
The steeper of the two lines in the left panel tells us that the labor market
penalty for those who likely arrived as undocumented immigrants after 1982
was greater than those who entered beforehand. The dierence in these two
slope coecients (in our regressions this is implicitly weighted by the densities
at each point) is essentially a dierence-in-dierence estimate. In the right
panel, we see dramatically less dierence in the wage penalties between these
two groups than we saw in the 1990 data. This is comforting, as no major
policy change occurred around 1992. Dierencing out this dierence from
the 1990 gure provides us with our triple dierence estimator.
Both Figure 2 and Figure 3 show us that the penalty to being undocu-
mented (i.e. how negative the slope of the line is) is higher for those who
came just after 1982 compared to those who came before 1982, but no higher
for those who came just after 1992 compared to those who came just before
1992. This is more evidence of an eect of IRCA on labor market outcomes,
both on total earnings, as well as on the earnings potential in the occupation
in which the immigrant worked 3.
The estimates from our triple dierence model given in Equation 6 are
presented in Table 4. The eects of a dierence-in-dierence estimation that
does not use any information about likely legal status nd very small esti-
3Our occupational earnings variable is computed by taking a mean of occupational
earnings in the Census for an equivalent sample of natives.
24mates of the eect of IRCA (Di-in-Di Time), on the order of 2 log points for
both earnings and mean occupational earnings. Neither result is statistically
signicant.
As with the graphical evidence, there seems to be a positive eect of
IRCA on both overall earnings and occupational earnings for our other two
models. The 1990-only dierence-in-dierence (Di-in-Di Legal Status), as
well as the triple dierence, both show evidence of a much larger eect of 15
log points on overall earnings and 16 log points on occupational earnings for
the di-in-di, and 20 and 19 log points for the triple dierence, respectively.
The estimated eects on overall earnings are not signicant for the dierence-
in-dierence model (p-value=.149), and marginally signicant for the triple
dierence model (p-value=.105). Given that these are based on estimated
legal status, that the rst stage model had a pseudo R-squared of only around
.10, and that there is generally a lot of unexplained variation in our very
simple earnings model, relatively imprecise results shouldn't be surprising.
Our estimates of mean earnings at the occupational level are estimated
much more precisely, also not surprising given how much less unexplained
variation there tends to be in this outcome variable as compared to individual
earnings (given that mean wages at the occupational level eliminates the
eect of individual specic heterogeneity on earnings). Here, we nd that
our estimates in the dierence-in-dierence model are signicant at the 1%
level, and our estimates are signicant at the 5% level 4.
4To provide a weak test of the validity of our identifying assumption, we also attempted
25The large eects on occupational wages are suggestive that occupational
mobility is one of the key benets provided by legal status. However, it does
not rule out dierential monopsony power over undocumented immigrants,
if between occupation dierential rates of exploitation exist. In Figure 4 we
present a locus of elasticities of labor supply to the rm for the documented
and undocumented that would rationalize the 20 log point dierence that
we estimate. The Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli (2009) estimates of these
elasticities are close to being on this line.
to identify only o of the interaction variables in the rst stage. In other words, we included
in the second stage education, marital status, and age of arrival in the U.S., allowing these
variables to directly aect the labor market outcome of the immigrant. Results from the
tripple-dierence estimation were around 6 log points smaller on both outcome variables,
but still larger than many of the previous results in the literature at around 14 log points.
The precision of these estimates was very similar.
263.3 Group Placebos
If our identifying assumption is valid, we would expect to only nd estimates
in Table 4 that are driven by IRCA. As most undocumented immigrants
aected by IRCA were from Mexico and Central America, we should observe
that estimates of change on income through IRCA of the triple dierences
for immigrants from other countries are close to zero 5.
In Table 5 and Table 6 we estimate our model for native born Hispanics
and all immigrants who were not born in Mexico. We select a subsample of
these workers with the same number of years of U.S. (total, in their case)
labor market experience as the Mexican born in our earlier sample. Results
are signicant for only 2 of the 18 regressions, never signicant and positive,
and never signicant in our triple dierence. We did not expect to nd
signicant results for either of these groups, especially U.S. born Hispanics;
results that did nd a treatment eect of IRCA for these untreated groups
would call our design into serious question.
In Figures 5 and 6, we present the distribution of T-statistics obtained
from estimating 48 triple dierence estimators. The estimates for "incwage"
are on annual earnings, and "occwage" are on the mean occupational earnings
in the occupation in which the immigrant is employed. These gures were
obtained from running a separate regression for each country with a migrant
5The above estimates rely on our estimates from the logistic regression on MMP data
and also have explanatory power in predicting the likelihood that migrants from other
countries are undocumented. To the extent that undocumented immigrants from all coun-
tries tend to arrive in the U.S. at younger ages and have lower levels of education, there
is likely some predictive power of our estimates.
27community numbering over 20,000 in both 1990 and 2000. We see that this
distribution approximates the Students' T distribution for the appropriate
degrees of freedom. In other words, there is no evidence of a contamination
eect that would bias us towards nding positive results on all migrants.
This indicates that the signicant result for Mexican migrants was either a
result of chance (standard Type 1 error), or that there is indeed a positive
eect for Mexican migrants, more so than other groups.
Of course, if immigrants from some other countries than just Mexico were
likely to be aected by IRCA, we would expect to nd more signicant results
than random chance would predict (seen by the small amount of increased
mass in the right tail of our empirical T-distributions). In Figures 7 and
8, we illustrate this point by presenting a scatter diagram of T-statistics
obtained in the country-wise triple dierence estimates, and an estimate of
the percent of that country's immigrant population that was legalized under
IRCA 6. We see there there is some positive correlation between percent
aected by the treatment and estimated signicance of the treatment eect.
This relationship is signicant in a weighted regression, but not robust to the
exclusion of Mexican migrants.
6This number was calculated through by comparing the total number of individuals
from each country appearing in the 1990 census to the estimated number of people from
each country obtaining legal status under IRCA according to the person weights in the
Legalized Population Survey.
283.4 Outcome Placebos
In our main estimations, we also rely upon an assumption that the composi-
tion of documented and undocumented Mexican immigrants has not changed
across time (before or after "2" years, in 2000 compared to 1990). To ad-
dress this possibility we run a series of regressions whose outcomes we believe
should not be aected by IRCA, but will be aected if immigrant character-
istics (observed or unobserved) have changed. They are reported in Table 7
and the outcomes reect characteristics of an immigrant dwelling and family.
The results show that only one of the outcomes have is aected in the triple
dierence, and only two outcomes are changed in the dierence-in-dierence
estimate that incorporates legal status.
294 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented estimates of the eect of IRCA on the la-
bor market outcomes of immigrants. We have done this taking advantage
of the policy design of IRCA and using other Mexican immigrants as a con-
trol group. We rst directly estimate the eect of changes in legal status on
changes in earnings with a xed eects estimate using MMP data, nding a
21 log point eect of obtaining legal status. Next, we employ an identica-
tion strategy that is based on estimating undocumented status for Mexican
immigrants in the Mexican Migration Project, and then recovering these
estimates to estimate the probability that an observation in the Census is
undocumented. Our results show that IRCA is associated with a marginally
signicant 20 log point increase in labor market earnings of Mexican immi-
grants, very similar to the estimates obtained with only MMP data. Es-
timates of the eect of IRCA on mean occupational wages are much more
precisely estimated, statistically signicant, and at 19 log points extremely
close in magnitude to the total estimated eect of IRCA. As not all undocu-
mented workers potentially eligible for IRCA received legal status under the
program, conceivably the true eect of the program is somewhat higher than
our estimates. Importantly, our estimates from the MMP data and Census
are similar in magnitude.
These results are based on two identifying assumptions. First, we assume
that our estimates are due to IRCA and not to a secular change in the labor
30market returns of all immigrants in the United States. Importantly, we nd
that estimates for immigrants from other countries, who did not benet from
IRCA to the extent that Mexican immigrants did, produce no systematic bias
towards positive and signicant results. Second, our results are not driven
by changes in the observed or unobserved characteristics of undocumented
immigrants across time. Similar estimates for outcomes that are not likely to
be determined by IRCA nd that our identication strategy fails to produce
economically and statistically signicant estimates as in the case of labor
income.
In summary, we have obtained results that provide credible evidence that
the eect of legal status gained through IRCA was larger than previously
estimated. We believe that this results from our use of other undocumented
workers as part of our counterfactual group, rather than a group such as
native born Latinos. Additionally, our results suggest that nearly all of
the eect of legal status on earnings comes through access to better paying
occupations. Both of these ndings should help inform policy makers about
both the magnitude and the mechanism of changes in legal status on labor
market outcomes.
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35Table 2: Logit on Legas Status: Migrants in MMP 1981-1985
Variable Coecient (Std. Err.)
Age at First Migration to U.S. -1.593 (1.146)
Age at First Migration to U.S. Squared 0.030 (0.021)
Years of Education 0.571 (1.546)
Years of Education Squared -0.031 (0.083)
Indicator for Single -32.458* (17.006)
Indicator for Married -26.583 (16.535)
Age/Education Interaction -0.111 (0.088)
Age Squared/Education Interaction 0.002 (0.002)
Age/Education Squared Interaction 0.006 (0.005)
Age Squared/Education Squared Interaction 0.000 (0.000)
Age/Married Interaction 1.987* (1.096)
Age/Single Interaction 2.512** (1.154)
Age Squared/Married Interaction -0.037** (0.020)
Age Squared/Single Interaction -0.050** (0.021)
Education/Married Interaction 0.763 (0.983)
Education/Single Interaction 0.982 (1.020)
Education Squared/Married Interaction -0.055 (0.050)






* denotes signcance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at 1% level
36Table 3: Fixed Eects Estimates from MMP: Migrants in MMP 1981-1985
Variable Coecient (Std. Err.)
Change in Documentation Status 0.208*** (0.073)





* denotes signcance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at 1% level
Table 4: Mexican Born Immigrants
Di-In-Di Di-In-Di Triple-Di
(Time) (Legal Status)
Incwage Beta 0.02 0.15 0.20
(0.02) (0.10) (0.13)
Occwage Beta 0.02** 0.16*** 0.19**
(0.01) (0.06) (0.08)
N 33860 12388 33860
Robust Standard Errors Clustered At State Level,
Procedure Bootstrapped with 5000 Reps
* denotes signcance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at 1% level
Table 5: Other Immigrants
Di-In-Di Di-In-Di Triple-Di
(Time) (Legal Status)
Incwage Beta 0.02 0.05 0.02
(0.02) (0.06) (0.09)
Occwage Beta -0.03* 0.04 0.01
(0.01) (0.04) (0.06)
N 48430 22044 48430
Robust Standard Errors Clustered At State Level,
Procedure Bootstrapped with 5000 Reps
37Table 6: Native Born Hispanics
Di-In-Di Di-In-Di Triple-Di
(Time) (Legal Status)
Incwage Beta -0.02 -0.12* -0.02
(0.02) (0.06) (0.08)
Occwage Beta -0.02 0.02 0.05
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
N 45672 19170 45672
Robust Standard Errors Clustered At State Level,
Procedure Bootstrapped with 5000 Reps
* denotes signcance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at 1% level
38Table 7: Placebo Outcomes for Mexican Migrants
DD Time DD Yhat DDD
Old Children 0.41* 2.16* 0.46
(0.22) (1.31) (1.65)
Young Children 0.11 1.16 0.72
(0.17) (0.98) (1.32)
Transit Time 0.01 -0.05 -0.00
(0.02) (0.09) (0.12)
Depart Time -17.41* -39.26 -4.28
(10.27) (48.15) (63.08)
Home Ownership -0.01 -0.07* -0.06
(0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
Cost Gas 0.09** -0.11 -0.16
(0.04) (0.21) (0.26)
Cost Water -0.06 -0.55** -0.63**
(0.04) (0.20) (0.25)
Cost Electricity 0.08*** -0.15 -0.23
(0.03) (0.15) (0.18)
Cost Fuel 0.02 0.01 -0.05
(0.02) (0.08) (0.10)
Phone 0.02** 0.08 0.07
(0.01) (0.05) (0.05)
Vehicle 0.12** -0.28 -0.18
(0.06) (0.32) (0.40)
* denotes signcance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at 1% level
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Figure 4: Elasticities of Labor Supply Rationalizing our Results
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Figure 8: Relationship between T-statistic (For Occupational Earnings)
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